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Abstract 
In the era of the globalising world, there are now an increasing number of multilateral agreements in the 
political, economic as well as in the socio-cultural arena. The South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) is 
one such attempt at ensuring the development of the South Asian sub-region. This agreement was a corrective 
measure after the failure of the erstwhile South Asian Preferential Trade Agreement (SAPTA). Has this 
agreement ensured the development of this region as a whole? Are bilateral ties predominant over such 
multilateral attempts? What are the challenges faced by SAFTA in its smooth functioning? The paper seeks to 
answer such questions by using a historical perspective and a explorative method. Apart from examining the 
agreement from various theoretical perspectives, this paper also delineates some of the benefits of SAFTA along 
with the challenges faced by it. Comparing various scholarly critics, the paper also compiles some of the 
drawbacks of the agreement which is quite useful from the policy perspective. In the international political 
realm, where globalisation can no longer be termed as a ‘new’ development, this paper reveals some of the 
complexities in dealing with such trends.  
 
Introduction 
Trade is the exchange of goods and services, and International Trade is the trade between countries. According 
to the proponents of globalisation, this type of trade leads to a world economy. It is then that the demand, supply 
and the prices impact and in turn is also impacted by global events. Liberals believe that International trade 
allows countries to use their resources (labour, technology, capital) more efficiently, because different countries 
are endowed with different natural resources and assets and some countries may be able to produce the same 
good more efficiently (specialisation), and therefore sell it more cheaply than other countries. For those countries 
that cannot produce the same goods efficiently, they can obtain it by trading. Thus, international trade not only 
increases but also allows countries to participate in global economy, encouraging foreign direct investment 
(FDI). Thus economies can grow more efficiently and become competitive economies. Economists further 
believe that this has a triggering effect raising employment levels and growth in the gross domestic product. One 
disadvantage of international trade (as put forth by Dependency theorists) is that countries that are 
technologically and/or economically far behind other [so-called advanced] countries and lack specialisation in 
their tradable goods, as is the case with a large number of developing countries, they are naturally disadvantaged 
in international trade with the advanced countries. Regional trade amongst such countries within a region helps 
in substantially reducing or eliminating this disadvantage. Such a trade (regional trade) is normally the result of 
suitable Regional Trade Agreements, and this instead leads to the development of a healthy regional economy, 
leading to an inclusive development of the participating countries with a region.       
The purpose of Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) is restructuring and rationalising industries to promote 
trade on a more efficient basis so as to exploit the economies of scale within a region. Regionalism also helps to 
protect internal markets by putting a common external tariff. They also promote political cooperation, and 
provide balanced and equitable benefits to countries belonging to small and less developed regions.   
The idea of RTAs had come into being in North America, Latin America and other regions. When this 
happened the region of South Asia appeared to be greatly marginalised in the world economy, as there was as yet 
no such trade agreement in this region. This region (South Asia) included countries of India, Pakistan, 
Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan and the Maldives, and the state of Afghanistan was later added to the region (in 
2007).  
In December 1985, the governments of these countries (except Afghanistan, which joined South Asia 
region much later, in 2007) came together to form an association called the South Asian Association of 
Regional Cooperation (SAARC). Its aim was to ensure cooperation that would help in promoting economic and 
social progress, cultural development, friendship and cooperation within the region. Over the years, there was a 
realisation that the political conflicts in the region were preventing the member states from co-operating 
economically and thus prevented the development of the region as a whole. After the Sixth SAARC summit in 
Sri Lanka (1991), an Inter-Governmental Group was set up to prepare an agreement to establish a South Asian 
Preferential Trade Arrangement (SAPTA). The framework agreement on SAPTA was approved in 1993 and 
implemented in December 1995.  
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SAPTA, a preferential trading arrangement, aims at promoting and sustaining mutual trade and economic 
cooperation by exchange of concession within the South Asia region. Four rounds of trade negotiations were 
concluded under SAPTA by 2002, where after the SAARC countries signed the next trade agreement, the 
framework agreement on South Asian Free Trade Area in 2004, and the South Asian Free Trade Agreement 
(SAFTA) finally came into effect at the beginning of 2006. 
SAFTA includes far reaching trade and investment liberalisation measures and a simplification of many 
procedures for businesses to remove various impediments and enable expansion of intra regional trade. But all 
along it has been a roller-coaster journey for the Region and the SAARC countries, as they have been trying to 
iron out differences between them on different fronts, and cooperate for the development of the region amidst 
trust, mistrust and differences. 
 
Free Trade versus Protectionism 
There are contrasting views about the level of control that must be placed for international trade, the opposing 
ends of which are known as free trade and protectionism.   
In free trade there are no restrictions on trade, and trade follows a laissez-faire approach. The demand and 
supply operating at a global level ensure efficiency in production and nothing special needs to be done to either 
promote or protect trade, as market forces automatically take care of that. That is, benefits accrue automatically 
in free trade, resulting from efficient markets. 
Protectionism, in contrast, is based on the belief that regulation of international trade is important to ensure 
that the market functions properly. It is believed that market inefficiencies might hamper the benefits of cross-
country trade, unless suitably guided by laws and agreements. This ‘protectionism’ can exist in many forms, but 
the common forms are things like controlled tariffs, quotas, and subsidies, which attempt to correct the 
inefficiency, if any, in the regional (or global) market. 
 
Liberalising protectionist regimes  
At the end of the Second World War, most of the South Asian nations due to a significant protectionist sentiment 
resorted to an inward oriented economy by means of Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI). ISI tended to 
limit trade, especially intra-regional trade.  
While intra-regional trade was not a new concept, the South Asian economies nevertheless were new to the 
ideas of regionalism and regionalisation. But there were several factors which when combined pointed towards a 
poor viability for short-term free trade agreement, and therefore this model actually discouraged trade, especially 
intra-region trade, in South Asia. It may be noted that most South Asian countries maintained an anti-export bias, 
a thrust towards public sector, and a controlled private sector.  
A notice at the pre-1990 tariff rates of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh are demonstrative of this. It was only 
post-1990 that the South Asian economies began opening up. In spite of this, South Asia continues to be a region 
marked by close economies next only to the socialist states. It was only gradually that these economies began to 
liberalise themselves. The reason was, as these economies grew and economic complementarities began to 
develop (albeit slowly), the South Asian countries found that SAFTA can offer substantial potential for their 
progress.  
 
Financial Sector Liberalisation 
South Asia failed to open its economy and attract any substantial degree of foreign investment. The Maldives are 
an exception in this regard, as it has attracted substantial degree of FDI in its tourism sector.  
But despite all attempts there has not been enough intra-region trade in South Asia. As a share in GDP, 
relative intra-regional trade in South Asia was amongst the lowest in the world, as may be seen from the  
Table 1 below where figures for the year 2004 has been presented.  
Table 1: Intra-Regional Trade as % GDP (2004) 
REGION INTRA-REGIONAL TRADE                       (AS % OF GDP, IN 2004) 
East Asia and Pacific 26.5%   
Europe and Central Asia 15.3% 
Latin America 6.4% 
Sub-Saharan Africa 5.3% 
Middle East and North Africa 3.5% 
South Asia 0.8% 
(Source: The World Bank Report, 2005: 43)  
There are many reasons for low intra-regional trade in South Asia. First, there has been in the past a low 
scope of mutual trade as there were less complementarities. However, the most important reason(s) for lack of 
intra-regional trade in the region has been persistent protectionism, long-standing conflicts amongst the countries 
of the region, and transportation constraints. The lack of supply capabilities by the smaller economies (as 
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opposed to huge import demands) has also been a reason for import demands.  
These however cannot be the only reason because there has been twice the amount of informal trade than 
formal ones. However, the level of intra-regional trade is increasing due to the growth in the economies of the 
SAARC countries, and interestingly, intra-regional trade has doubled during the period 2003 to 2006. 
 
Terms of SAPTA 
In December 1991, the Sixth Summit held in Colombo approved the establishment of an Inter-Governmental 
Group (IGG) to formulate an agreement to establish a SAARC Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA) by 
1997. Given the consensus within SAARC, the Agreement on SAPTA was signed on 11 April 1993 and entered 
into force on 7 December 1995, well in advance of the date stipulated by the Colombo Summit. The Agreement 
reflected the desire of the member states to promote and sustain mutual trade and economic cooperation within 
the SAARC region through the exchange of concessions. 
The basic principles underlying SAPTA are: 
a. Overall reciprocity and mutuality of advantages so as to benefit equitably all Contracting States, taking 
into account their respective level of economic and industrial development, the pattern of their external 
trade, and trade and tariff policies and systems; 
b. Negotiation of tariff reform step by step, improved and extended in successive stages through periodic 
reviews; 
c. Recognition of the special needs of the Least Developed Contracting States and agreement on concrete 
preferential measures in their favour; and 
d. Inclusion of all products, manufactures and commodities in their raw, semi-processed and processed 
forms. 
A Positive list approach was followed by SAFTA. According to this approach each of the member states 
specified which commodity would be traded under the liberal tariffs.  
Four rounds of trade negotiations have been concluded under SAPTA. At the conclusion of the first round 
of talks, about 200 articles were covered. After the second round the list increased to 1,200. This increased to 
2,700 commodities by the end of the third round. Finally, about 5,000 commodities were resolved by the end of 
the fourth round. Each Round contributed to an incremental trend in the product coverage and the deepening of 
tariff concessions over previous Rounds (SAARC Website). 
 
How and why did SAPTA fail? 
SAPTA appeared to be very ambitious with its objective of increasing trade. Some problems (as enumerated 
below) however emerged which proved SAPTA to be practically unworkable (Weerakoon, 2001).  
First, while countries were generous with their concessions, the actual trade coverage of those preferences was 
very low.  
Second, in many cases the limit of the tariff cuts offered under the preferential agreement were limited.  
Third, many of the goods offered under the concessions were not amongst the import interests of the South 
Asian countries, and were thus of no use.  
Fourth, many of the countries had still stuck on to their protectionist policies.  
Fifth (and finally), domestic crises and tense relations were amongst the other reasons for the failure of SAPTA.  
 
WTO rules regarding RTAs 
World Trade Organisation has specified certain standards for Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs). We need to 
understand its basic principles in order to specify whether SAFTA adheres to the WTO standards.  
There are three basic clauses. First, the member countries must have substantial amount of trade. The 
article must provide for mutual/reciprocal trade concessions. Second, a fixed period of time must be specified 
for attaining the given concessions. Third, the attainment of trade liberalisation must not place barriers towards 
third parties, higher than those existing before the formation of the RTA. 
There is also an enabling clause added as a sort of an exception. The enabling clause authorises in its 
paragraph 2(c) that WTO developing members can depart from the MFN (Most Favoured Nation) clause while 
concluding treaties between themselves, or at a regional or global level containing mutual concessions on lower 
or zero tariffs, and non-tariff barriers subject to WTO guidelines.  
The enabling clause is only an option for developing countries.  
 
Rise of the Concept of SAFTA 
SAFTA was first initiated and adopted by the SAARC member states in January 2004. The key areas of tariff 
liberalisation were discussed on schedule by January 2006. It was meant that SAFTA would be implemented by 
July 2006. This was agreed to in the Islamabad declaration.  
A negative list approach was adopted this time. The prior arrangement of the positive list had proved too 
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time consuming and impractical. The negative list and the sensitive list approach would make the formulation 
easier.  
According to the schedule, the agreement would be fully implemented amongst the non-LDC (Least 
Developed Countries) member states by 2013 and for the LDC member states by 2016. The LDC member states 
were given a greater time to reduce tariff barriers. The non-LDC member states were given a period of two years 
to reduce the tariff barriers to 20 percent and another four years to reduce the tariffs to the range of 0-5 percent. 
The LDC member states were given a time of three years to reduce their tariffs down to 30 percent and another 
eight years to reduce them further to 0-5 percent.  
As we may thus observe, the WTO clause of giving a fixed time period to liberalise tariffs was well adhered 
to. Moreover, the enabling clause regarding the flexibility for Less Developed Countries was also given due 
consideration.  
A Dispute Settlement Mechanism was also laid in place. Any of the member countries could bring their 
economic disputes to the forum. The forum would settle the dispute and give its judgment latest by 330 days. 
The concerned party (or parties) would have to adhere to the judgment latest by 90 days.   
 
Goals of SAFTA 
If we see theoretically, the lines on which SAFTA was built is based on the idea of profits gained by means of 
complex interdependence. The idea of complex interdependence is a neo-liberal conception, first put forth by 
Keohane and Nye.  
There is an inherent belief in the neo-liberal conception, that states and their fortunes are inextricably tied 
together. Their idea was to show how international politics is transformed by means of interdependence. 
According to the theorists, in today’s scenario, as the transactions are increasing, military dependencies are 
reducing but still remain important (Keohane and Nye, 1997). The theorists also differentiated between inter-
dependence and dependence to show the role played by power in international politics.  
Secondly, with the advent of SAFTA, there is a possibility of working upon the confidence building 
measures. Greater economic co-operation would lead to lesser primacy of the military policy as a tool (as 
contended by Keohane and Nye). There are chances that the existing political conflicts would take a back-seat 
given the economic interdependence of the countries. In the case of South Asia, India has had conflicts with 
many of the South Asian countries, mainly Pakistan. The creation of SAFTA intended to lighten the conflicts 
given the greater number of transactions.  
 
Myth of free trade – presence of the sensitive list 
It was, however, understood that some items should be excluded from increased competition, even from the Less 
Developed Countries. Such items were placed under the Sensitive List of items. Initially it was decided that 
under the Tariff Liberalisation Programme, a liberal approach would be adopted and the sensitive list would be 
limited to 10 percent of the tariff lines. The final decision, however, was to retain a sensitive list of 20 percent of 
the tariff lines for the non-LDC member states, and a list of similar approximation for the LDC member states 
(Weerakoon and Thennakoon, 2006). 
Under such circumstance, the trade coverage of items under sensitive list may be fairly high. Unlike 
ASEAN Free Trade Agreement, there is no provision in SAFTA to bring down the list of items covered in the 
sensitive list. The only provision provided by SAFTA is a ‘review’ of the sensitive list every four years ‘with the 
view of reducing the list’. In fact, the existing bilateral FTAs have much lower limits of sensitive lists than 
SAFTA.  
SAFTA had begun with a limited approach to liberalising trade than had been anticipated. This can be seen 
by the fact that 53 percent of the import trade amongst the South Asian countries by value in 2004 has been 
excluded from the SAFTA liberalisations.   
In spite of the large negative list, Pakistan has excluded only 17 percent of its import from SAARC 
countries from the tariff liberalisation process. In contrast, India and Sri Lanka have restricted about 38% and 
52% of their total imports from SAARC countries by means of the sensitive list. The LDC states have restricted 
about 65-75 percent of their imports.  
The imbalances in the trade of SAFTA are very clear. A large proportion of the items in the export list of 
the SAARC countries, fall in the negative list of other SAARC countries. Pakistan, for instance, may have 
restricted only 17 percent of imports, but 34% of its exports fall into the negative lists of India and Pakistan. 
Same goes for the export list of India and Sri Lanka. The LDC member states of SAFTA have received better 
treatment in this regard. The percentage of export trade restricted by negative lists of other SAFTA members is 
substantially lower than in the case of other non-LDC member states.  
 
Case of India and Pakistan 
One of the brighter sides of SAFTA is to see that India and Pakistan have been quite liberal towards each other. 
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Only 14.5 percent of Pakistan’s current imports from India are subject to its negative list, while the Indian 
negative list excludes a similar share of 16.4 percent of Pakistan’s exports to India.   
Converting Kashmir Valley into a Free Trade Economic zone has proved to be a bridge between the two 
countries rather than a ‘bone of contention’. It seems that New Delhi and Islamabad have gone a step closer in 
this regard as a means of confidence building measures  (TNN The Times of India, 7 April 2007). 
 
Impediments to the success of SAFTA 
One of the primary impediments to the successful progress of SAFTA is the set of nuclear tests performed in 
India in 1998.  
A time period of ten years has been stipulated by SAFTA to get down the tariffs. Given the level of 
conflicts within the region, this time period is too long to ensure the practicability of agreement. Compared to all 
other Free Trade Agreements, the one provided by SAFTA is the longest and thus the most impractical.  
SAFTA has had a very narrow coverage. Different countries have put a wide range of commodities under 
the purview of negative or sensitive list. Around 58.5 percent of India’s exports are subject to the sensitive list. 
The proportions of other countries include 22 percent for Bangladesh, 57.6 percent for Maldives, 46.4 percent 
for Nepal, 34 percent for Pakistan and 47 percent for Sri Lanka. This does not support the proposal for regional 
integration, of course.  
Non-tariff barriers and para-tariff measures have been set up by most of the SAARC states. These barriers 
nullify the effect of Tariff Liberation Programme. Though it has been stated that these barriers would be 
subsequently removed, no time frame has been specified. Had there been a time frame, of say 3 years or so, then 
it would have induced immediate action on the part of the SAARC states (The United States Agency for 
International Development, 2005).  
SAFTA has a Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM), but it does not follow the best practices. It is time 
bound, but the time period specified is so long that may lengthen the execution of any decision and may even 
render any practical decision ineffective. The entire process in SAFTA can take up 330 days as compared to 290 
days taken up by ASEAN and 310 days taken up by NAFTA. The time period for compliance in SAFTA is 90 
days, while for NAFTA and ASEAN is 30 days. This reduces the effectiveness of DSM as a speedy method to 
redress economic disputes.  
Trade facilitation in the SAARC countries does not compliment tariff liberalisation. The transits are very 
slow. There is no Single Window for SAARC trading. The delay in transit often leads to perishable goods being 
reduced in quality on the way. Moreover, all these countries have different standards of health, environment and 
safety rules. This prevents the chances of a common market within the region. There are also different standards 
for testing, import inspections, product certification and systems certification.    
A major drawback as regards the success of SAFTA was the low supply capabilities of the LDCs. Many of 
the countries lacked capital. The measures in SAFTA were not ample to induce greater investments in the LDCs. 
Investments would have strengthened their supply capabilities and thus promoted intra-regional trade. After the 
India-Sri Lanka FTA, Indian investments in Sri Lanka increased and thus facilitated India-Sri Lanka trade. If 
such measures would have been in the SAFTA provisions, it would have surely increased intra-regional trade.  
Another concern is whether the bilateral trade agreements between various SAARC countries would 
undermine the importance of SAFTA. The coexistence of these bilateral trade agreements along with SAFTA 
raises the issue as to whether the former should be incorporated within the latter or not. In case of a conflict 
between the two, which one is to be accepted? Indo-Nepal FTA there is no negative list, which would probably 
not be accepted by any of the other SAARC members.  
If bilateral agreements and SAFTA coexist, then there would be the problem of what the economists call: 
the ‘spaghetti bowl’ of overlapping trade agreements which can cause a lot of confusions.  
The rise of BIMSTEC which involves five of the SAARC countries, may also pose a problem in the near future.  
 
Does SAFTA have a potential of an Economic Union? 
There is tremendous scope for the liberalisation of the service sector amongst the SAARC countries. The New 
Delhi Summit in 2007 stressed on the liberalisation in trade for the services and called for the finalisation of an 
Agreement for the Service sector in the near future.  
 
Analysis in terms of schools of thought 
Realist contention  
The economic-realists believe that all nation-states are self-interested and opportunists. They further believe that 
all associations and agreements can be viewed as interests defined in terms of ‘power’. It is in this context that 
SAFTA has often been viewed (Jones, 1992).  
India is geographically and economically the most powerful country in this region. There is thus a lot of 
suspicion regarding the hegemonic role played by India in the region. Given that India is the most developed 
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country in the region, other countries in South Asia are skeptical that their markets might be flooded by Indian 
goods.  
The economic realists do not accept the fact that the agreement can be equally beneficial to all the counties 
in the region.  
 
Marxist view 
The Marxists are against the concept of free market and free trade. They believe in the success of closed 
economies where the working class is protected from the competition and exploitation of the free market.  
For agreements like SAFTA, the Marxists believe that if at all there are any benefits reaped by means of 
comparative advantages and low cost of production, it would be reaped only by the capitalist class. Since the 
labour availability is high in the South Asian countries, the market forces of demand and supply would pull 
down their wages. They will always continue to be under-paid. The cycle of poverty would continue, and the 
poor would always remain poor. 
Marxist scholars further argue that while FDI would induce investment and new firms, the traditional 
industries have chances of being competed out of the market. This would add to the problem of joblessness in 
the South Asian regions. Only big businessmen and at times the middle class would reap the benefits of cross-
border free trade.   
 
Conclusion 
We may thus conclude that SAFTA was a fine attempt by the South Asian countries to establish a Free Trade 
Area. It was a more practical arrangement as compared to the previous attempts of SAARC and SAPTA. The 
shift from the positive list approach to the negative list was a pragmatic one. The setting up of a Dispute 
Settlement Mechanism also was a good development taking into account the fact that there are a number of 
political clashes which impinge upon the economics of trade.  
The project of SAFTA, is however slow in progress. The lethargy in progress is mainly due to the structural 
drawbacks of the agreement itself which has a few loopholes. Moreover the time provided for implementing the 
agreement is too long. This puts a question on the seriousness of the project.  
There is a lot of suspicion in the air regarding the hegemonic role played by India, economically being the 
most powerful country in the region. While India is quite satisfied with the project, other countries are worried 
that their markets may be soon flooded by Indian products. There are other scholars who are skeptical regarding 
the very idea of free trade and its implication on the marginalised sections of the society.  
If we consider the success of SAFTA vis-à-vis other Free Trade Agreements, the performance of SAFTA is 
quite poor indeed. Locating the data of intra-regional trade and benefits reaped from FTAs, SAFTA shows quite 
slow progress mostly because of the larger time frame, lack of complementarities of trade, less provisions for 
revisions and many other reasons. Intra-regional trade in South Asia is amongst the lowest as compared to other 
regions.  
There is however a lot of scope, especially if one considers the idea of free trade in the service sector. 
Proposals regarding this had been accepted in the 16th summit of SAARC held in Bhutan. Facilitating trade by 
means of common standards is also a means of improving the efficiency of SAFTA. Lack of continuous 
revisions was also an issue which is in the way of progress. While the time period of revisions of tariffs has not 
been specified in the SAFTA charter, yet the next round of revisions is said to be held in November 2012.  
After the successful experience of NAFTA and ASEAN FTA, SAFTA is thus underway to a successful 
integration.   
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